Something I’ve closely observed in metascience twitter (& now here)—but likely happens elsewhere in online academia where unnecessarily polarized groups exist: Someone doesn’t like someone else’s work & leaves a snarky, condescending comment; some others like it, none of them saying anything useful.
This isn’t criticism or intellectual disagreement. It’s plain nasty behavior. I’m even ready to forgive some passing snark. But it becomes ugly when others start liking it without engaging with the ideas or the work at all. I believe that’s one of the reasons academic twitter became so hostile.
Yes it takes effort to read work that you find yourself in disagreement with & we don’t always have the spoons for it. It’s better in those cases to just opt out altogether rather than being passive aggressive. It’s best if you can find a way to state your disagreements in a constructive way.
Also consider that your perceived hostility is hardly inevitable. It’s actually possible that there’s no need to feel so polarized about random methodological issues. Different perspectives exist. We’re capable of communicating about them without acting like schoolyard bullies. Or should be. [my underline]
That’s also half of the reviews I get in this dysfunctional field, where the “like” is the editor passing the completely useless, snarky reviews on to me.
Absolutely, critiquing someone’s work constructively requires effort, time, and a willingness to actually engage with the ideas. Online spaces encourage superficial interactions where snark or dismissiveness is easier than substantive and helpful critique.
Critiquing is simple. It’s usually just about saying that the entire project is misguided. You should just do Y instead of X. Constructive criticism usually means running the models, thinking seriously about the argument. It’s hard to do that unless you join the research project and spend a considerable amount of time working on it. In my view, what aims to be constructive criticism from far away is almost always just vague. To be helpful you need to be serious about the whole thing.
But I think there’s more, the “different perspectives exist” argument assumes a relativistic stance that obviously feels unsatisfying to some (not to me, I agree with Devezer), especially when one believes their perspective is not only more accurate but also has real-world consequences if ignored or misunderstood.
Their argument is something like: some perspectives are demonstrably better, more predictive, or more useful. Dangerous or misleading ideas can lead to harm, intellectually, practically, or socially. In such cases, tolerating “different perspectives” might feel like enabling misinformation or perpetuating harmful stuff. For example, in methodological disputes, a flawed approach can lead to invalid results, wasted resources, harmful policy recommendations.
Some people think everything else than testing theories à la Popper is such a flawed approach. That’s why they are so pissed with Devezer’s Feyerabend-inspired pluralism. Their “plain nasty behavior” is part of this attempt to fight the flawed approach (invalid results, wasted resources, harmful policy recommendations). Again, I personally agree with Devezer. I’m just not sure what the way forward is.
Here, Carl Schmitt would argue that the notion of “different perspectives” is a liberal fiction that obscures the fundamental reality of political and intellectual conflict, which is rooted in the distinction between friend and enemy. For Schmitt, disagreement is not merely about differing methodologies or ideas but a struggle for dominance, where one must assert the truth of their position decisively rather than seek compromise. I strongly disagree, of course, but I think we underestimate the strength of Schmitt’s challenge.
When someone says our pluralistic interpretative methods are a waste of time and money, they mean it. To philosophical conservatives, some economists, your typical scientific naturalist like Alan Sokal, it’s not obvious at all if scientific pluralism does more good than harm. I suppose they turn Feyerabend’s quip on its head; “anything goes” when it’s to critique what they deem harmful research methods. What we value in research is inherently political: do we prioritize pluralism or positivism? Do we embrace disagreement as a productive force, or view it as a struggle for dominance? Where do we draw the line between what is acceptable and what is not?